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Abstract. In this paper, I develop a philosophical clarification of the statement 
“faith in the resurrection of Christ saves men from sin”, using some of the main 
arguments and hypotheses of my recent book, The Ways of Salvation (Les Voies 
du salut, Paris, 2010). I begin with some remarks on the theme of salvation in 
contemporary language and philosophy. I then sketch a conceptual analysis of 
the concept of salvation, first in its general sense, then in its specifically Christian 
one. Finally, I offer a hypothesis on the modus operandi of salvation, or at least of 
one aspect of salvation as understood by Christianity.
I. tHe tHeme oF SAlVAtIoN IN CoNtemPorArY DISCourSe
The concept of salvation still occurs regularly in ordinary language. It 
also appears, typically without being defined clearly, in a  number of 
contemporary philosophical works far removed from Christianity.
It is striking how commonly the notion of salvation and related 
words (the verb ‘to save’, the nouns ‘saviour’, ‘salvage’) are used in most 
european languages. In French, people greet one another with the word 
“salut,” in Italian they say “salve,” or “ti saluto,” in German they say “salü,” 
(or “heil,” “heil dich,” in the past). Though people using the word in such 
situations may not know it, this recalls an ancient practice of wishing 
an interlocutor ‘salvation’ upon meeting. For instance, Pythagorean 
philosophers appear to have greeted each other with the word ‘health!’ 
ugiainein, (a greeting also found in the New Testament, at the beginning 
of The Third letter of John), and Seneca’s letters to lucilius often begin 
euroPeAN JourNAl For PHIloSoPHY oF relIGIoN 3/2 (AutumN 2011), PP. 387-407
DeNIS moreAu388
with the formula: “Seneca Lucilio suo salutem dat.” The themes of saviour, 
salvage, salvation, which are etymologically as well as conceptually 
related to that of salvation are also increasingly common in political 
discourse (such and such a person is considered the country’s saviour), 
economic discourse (the salvage of a corporation), as well as computer 
discourse (we save or salvage data). Finally, on a  funnier, but no less 
meaningful note, French supermarkets sell a  shower gel called “Axe. 
Difficult morning, anti-hangover.” The product’s packaging states quite 
clearly that it is intended for people who have a hard time waking up after 
partying, while the label describes its properties in terms that could come 
straight from a theology class: “miracle shower gel […] it will save your 
morning and bring you back to life after a short and restless night.”
of course, the very frequency with which the concept of salvation is 
used means that in a certain way it is spent, close to losing its meaning 
from being used in too many contexts. but it might also be fair to ask 
whether this frequency of use doesn’t echo, albeit weakly, ancient 
questions, long-standing concerns. In fact, if someone wanted to develop 
a Christian apologetic on the basis of the contemporary world’s language 
use and dominant concerns, this theme of salvation would probably be 
an interesting starting point, a ‘good hold’ as people use the word ‘hold’ 
in rock-climbing.
All the more so because, while this notion of salvation retains, in its 
technical use at least, strongly religious and more specifically Christian 
connotations, it crops up in a surprising way in the writings of philosophers 
who are not particularly known for their support of Christianity, or are 
even quite critical of it.
Nietzsche is a striking if ambiguous example. As everyone knows, he 
sees himself as a fierce opponent of Christianity. but in several texts, he 
advocates a system of thought that, like Christianity, will lead to salvation 
– as long as we interpret salvation in accordance with its etymology, as 
a healing, the conclusion of a struggle against disease and weakness that 
yields ‘the great health’.1 The word also occurs in Jean-Paul Sartre, in the 
famous last page of his autobiography The Words: “my sole concern has 
been to save myself – nothing in my hands, nothing up my sleeve – by 
work and faith. As a result, my pure choice did not raise me above anyone. 
1 See, for example, Ecce Homo, “Why I am so clever,” I; Thus Spoke Zarathustra, I and II. 
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Without equipment, without tools, I  set all of me to work in order to 
save all of me. If I relegate impossible Salvation to the prop-room, what 
remains?”2 Similarly, in a  rather mysterious footnote at the end of the 
section in Being and Nothingness called “Second attitude toward others: 
indifference, desire, hate, sadism”, Sartre adds: “These considerations do 
not exclude the possibility of an ethics of deliverance and salvation. but 
this can be achieved only after a  radical conversion which we can not 
discuss here.”3 ludwig Wittgenstein, in a  text from Culture and Value 
(1937), for his part, wrote: “If I am to be really saved [erlöst], what I need 
is certainty, not wisdom, dreams, or speculation […] For it is my soul 
with its passions, as it were with its flesh and blood, that has to be saved 
[erlöst], not my abstract mind.”4 And finally, michel Foucault declares, 
in a way that is both enigmatic and fascinating, “I know that knowledge 
has the power to transform us, that truth is not just a way of deciphering 
the world […], but that, if I know the truth, then I will be transformed, 
maybe even saved. or else I will die. but I believe, in any case, that for me 
these two are the same.”5
These texts have three things in common: the theme of salvation is, 
for different reasons, unexpected; we understand, as we read them, that it 
is an important notion, one that reflects a concern essential to the author 
who uses it; but neither the context of these texts, nor, often, the entire 
corpus of their authors, give us a clear idea of how we should interpret 
‘salvation’ or ‘being saved’. Such conceptual blurriness, if not legitimate, 
is at least acceptable in the realm of ordinary language. but it is more 
problematic in a philosophical discourse that aims at conceptual clarity 
and rigor. to remedy this situation, I propose here a short clarification of 
the concept of salvation.
2 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Words, translated from the French by bernard Frechtman, 
Vintage books, 1981, p. 255
3 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, translated and with an introduction by 
Hazel e. barnes, Washington Square Press, 1956, p. 534, n. 13
4 ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, translated by Peter Winch, (oxford: basil 
blackwell, 1974), pp. 32-33 
5 “Interview,” by Stephen riggins (1982; Dits et Ecrits, Paris, Gallimard, 2001), II, 1354
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II. ClArIFICAtIoN oF tHe CoNCePt oF SAlVAtIoN
Historically, among the Greeks and romans, the word salvation first 
meant the state of being or remaining whole and in good health, “safe and 
sound.” to be saved, then, was to be healed, and salvation, in the practical 
sense, meant health –  not just physical, but also moral and spiritual 
health. In a more abstract sense, salvation meant both having reached 
a desirable way of life, as well as the process of attaining it, by being either 
removed from a situation or freed from a danger that somehow separated 
us from it. In a general sense, then, salvation can be understood as the 
return to a desirable former state that had been lost (as when one is saved 
from a  sickness or a  shipwreck), the safeguarding of this state against 
a threat (as one saves one’s freedom from a potential oppressor, or one’s 
life from a  danger), or, finally, the improvement attaining this state 
represents. The meaning of the word salvation can, in short, be analyzed 
into two parts. understood in its negative aspect, to be saved means to be 
delivered and freed, rescued and ripped away from a dangerous situation 
where looms a serious menace. understood in its positive aspect, to be 
saved means being granted some good, reaching a state seen as beneficial 
or desirable, progressing from trials and wretchedness to a  state of 
happiness and fulfilment. Therefore, I think we should find two elements 
in any soteriology.
(A) A pessimistic or lucid diagnosis of our present situation as one 
that is painful and dangerous, a state we are inevitably and structurally 
thrown into, and out of which we must claw our way. An optimistic 
theory that held that everything is naturally for the best and will continue 
that way could not be called a soteriology.
(b) A more optimistic assessment of whether it is possible to leave 
this grievous state behind. If a theory accepts the pessimistic diagnosis 
of the human condition described in (A), but judges that we are bound 
to remain in this state of wretchedness, decay, and misery, then it is not 
describing human existence from a soteriological point of view.
Within the framework of these two elements, we can highlight 
a number of criteria to distinguish different kinds of soteriologies. For 
instance, we can distinguish different types of soteriology based on:
(a) Whether salvation is achieved through oneself (auto-salvation) 
or through someone else, something external to the self (hetero-
salvation). I  will return to this distinction, which plays an essential 
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role in differentiating Christian soteriology from most other forms of 
soteriology developed in philosophical contexts.
(b) The manner of reaching salvation. Individualistic theories hold 
that it is individuals who reach salvation, and holistic views assume that 
salvation is achieved collectively, by a  group (a  community, a  nation, 
a Church, humanity as a whole).
(c) How broadly the class of the saved is extended. Some theories 
include only a few or a small group among the saved, some include the 
greater part of humanity, and some universalist or even cosmic doctrines 
include all of humanity, or even the entire universe, among the saved.
(d) Where salvation will take place: immanent theories hold that 
salvation is attained in this world, while some reserve salvation for 
another world.
(e) The nature of the alleged saviour: it can be a god (theo-soteriology), 
a man or a group of men (anthropo-soteriology), or even something else 
(extra-terrestrial beings, etc.).
(f) What degree of salvation is attainable: some theories hold that 
salvation is partial, others that it is total, others integrate the two into 
a process of salvation in stages or degrees.
(g) The nature of salvation, its content: most often, it is happiness, 
but even if we leave aside the well-known difficulties in agreeing on 
a  common definition of happiness6, there is no logical obstacle to 
imagining a different content for salvation.
let us consider, for instance, how the marxism of the 19th and 20th 
centuries, interpreted as a  theory of salvation (or rather a  secularized 
transposition of a theology of salvation)7, fits many of these categories. 
marxism combines (a) auto-salvation (it is human beings who save 
themselves) and (e) anthropo-soteriology: it relies on a  group of men 
(the proletariat, or its educated avant-garde) who hold the function 
of saviour in a period of transition (until the foundation of a classless 
society) to achieve a salvation which (c) all men or humanity as a whole 
share. This is (b) the conclusion of a collective process, which consists in 
(g) a happiness that is (f) complete and (d) obtained in this world.
6 Cf. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, I, 2
7 See Karl löwith, Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of 
History (Chicago, university of Chicago Press, 1949), ch. 2
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III. tHe SPeCIFICAllY CHrIStIAN CoNCePt oF SAlVAtIoN
The New Testament attests that Jesus, whose Hebrew name Yeshoua 
means ‘God saves,’ was quickly recognized by his disciples as the ‘saviour’ 
(salvator, sôter), the one who saves (salvare, sôzô) or brings salvation.8 
These early Christian texts use different themes, different images, to 
describe the status of the one who is saved, and the nature of salvation. 
The saved man is an invalid cured by Christ, a slave he frees, a debtor 
whose debt he forgives, a  man possessed whose demonic bonds he 
looses, a man condemned whom he pardons, a dead man he brings back 
to life, etc.9
one feature distinguishes Christian soteriology very clearly from 
those that can be found in ancient wisdom, the philosophical classics 
(e.g., Spinoza)10, Nietzsche, even, when he advises “independents” to “get 
up on their own”11, and contemporary thought that emphasizes human 
or personal autonomy. Indeed, for all other soteriologies, salvation is 
something that man, or in some cases humanity understood collectively, 
can achieve on his own, by his own actions, by making the best use of his 
own strengths and natural powers – where the rational powers are often 
singled out –  in a  process that is clearly a  form of auto-salvation. The 
end of chapter 9, book IV of Epictetus’s Discourses neatly synthesizes this 
conception of salvation: “look, you have been dislodged though by no 
8 See, for example, Acts of the Apostles, 4:12, and 13:23; I John, 4:14; Gospel of luke, 
2:11.
9 For more fully developed typologies, as well as detailed studies on the theme of 
salvation in different New testament texts, see, for example, Le Salut Chrétien. Unité et 
diversité des conceptions à travers l’histoire, ed. Jean-louis leuba (Paris, Desclée, 1995); 
Salvation in the New Testament, Perspectives on Soteriology, ed. Jan G. van den Watt 
(leiden-boston, brill, 2005); Alloys Grillmeier, “Die Wirkung des Heilshandelns Gotte in 
Christus” in Mysterium Salutis, ed. Johannes Feiner and Dan magnus löhrer (einsiedeln, 
benziger, 1969), vol. III-2, pp. 327-390.
10 See, for example, Jean lacroix, Spinoza et le problème du salut (Paris, PuF, 1970). The 
explicit goal of Spinoza’s Ethics is to “lead, as if by the hand, to knowledge of the human 
mind and its supreme blessedness” (beginning of part II) which is identified as “salvation” 
(V, 36, scolie).
11 Posthumous text cited in Didier Franck, Nietzsche et l’ombre de Dieu (Paris, 
PuF, 1998), p. 427. Cf. Ecce Homo, “Why I am so wise,” § 2: “I took myself in hand and 
I healed myself.” We can also remember the taunt “Save yourself ” shouted at Christ on the 
cross according to the Gospels (matthew 27:40).
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one else but yourself. […] turn yourself away to return […] to freedom 
[…]. And now, are you not willing to come to your own rescue? […] If 
you seek something better, go ahead and continue what you are doing. 
Not even a god can save you.” 12
Christian salvation, by contrast, is “salvation from elsewhere” 
(“hetero-salvation”). man cannot reach it on his own, and it requires an 
external, divine and supernatural intervention: from a  saviour, or else 
from a revelation – if by revelation we understand a body of knowledge 
that can neither be found in oneself nor gathered by human intellectual 
capacities alone, but must be received. The Christian approach to the 
concept of salvation, then, introduces a notion of, if not passivity, at least 
receptivity or dependence on an other (or an other), that is, in the broad 
sense, a notion of heteronomy.
Salvation as understood by Christianity should therefore be defined 
as “movement from a negative to a positive state brought about by an 
external agent [which presupposes] three elements: a terminus, a starting 
point, and a transforming agent;”13 or else, “a process whose beneficiaries 
are moved from a negative situation to a new fulfilled existence by the 
action of an external agent.”14 In this case, the external agent is Jesus 
Christ, who, according to different acceptable translations of a  series 
of Greek verbs used in the New testament “frees,” (eleutheroô), “saves” 
(sôzô), “delivers” (rhuomai, luô), “tears away” (exaireô) humanity so that 
it can reach a new way of life.
That Christ is the saviour and that he saves men from sin is an idea that 
is so obvious to those who accept the Christian faith, that, unlike other 
concepts also central to Christianity (the trinity, Christ’s two natures, 
etc.), it has never been seriously contested or rejected by any important 
currents in Christian thought. As a consequence, the great councils that 
enabled Christians to clarify important but controversial aspects of their 
12 I am following, with some modifications, W. A. oldfather’s translation in Epictetus, 
The discourses as Reported by Arrian, The Manual, and Fragments, loeb Classical library, 
volume II, pp. 395-397.
13 Paul-Évode beaucamp, Supplément au Dictionnaire de la Bible (Paris, letouzey et 
Ané), vol. 11, col. 516.
14 The different components of this definition are taken from raymond Winling, 
La  Bonne nouvelle du salut en Jésus-Christ. Sotériologie du Nouveau Testament (Paris, 
Cerf, 2007).
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faith, and thus to discriminate between orthodox and heretical theses, 
never made it the object of a dogmatic clarification.15 The creed of the 
councils of Nicaea and Constantinople tells us only that Christ came « for 
us men and for our salvation  » (Τὸν δι’ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ διὰ 
τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν κατελθόντα ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν / Qui propter nos 
homines, et propter nostram salutem descendit de caelis).
How the process of salvation works, its modus operandi, was thus 
left so open that it has given rise to a number of speculative accounts, 
about which it is not always easy to decide whether they are rivals, or 
whether they bring to light, without fully coordinating or synthesizing 
their incomplete accounts, different aspects of the concept of salvation. 
In latin Christianity, for the last thousand years, the dominant answer to 
the question of how salvation works was the satisfaction theory proposed 
by Anselm of Canterbury in the Cur Deus Homo, and developed later, 
most notably by Thomas Aquinas and later Thomists.16 I find this theory 
quite powerful, and I think that conceptually it is still relevant. but I don’t 
want to ignore the fact that this explanation has become almost foreign, 
so to speak, or “inaudible” for many of our contemporaries. It has in fact 
become commonplace, for Christians and non-Christians alike, to reject 
the satisfaction theory of salvation as “judicial”, “sacrificial”, “vengeful”, 
and “vindictive”. our contemporaries criticize its characterization of 
salvation as a “compensatory transaction”, and the way it seems to worship 
pain by concentrating all of Christ’s saving work in his passion and the 
sufferings that accompany it.17 moreover, in focusing so exclusively on 
15 Among Catholics, the “schemata from the preparatory sessions” of the first Vatican 
council (1869-70) had considered defining redemption, but the texts were neither 
discussed nor voted on by the council (which was cut short by the Italian army’s arrival in 
rome). See Jean rivière, Le Dogme de la rédemption (Paris, Gabalda, 1931), pp. 116-120. 
There is also a mention (without definition) of the theme of “satisfaction” in a text from 
the 6th session of the council of trent.
16 See Summa Theologiae, III, questions 46-49; see also, for example, eleonore Stump, 
“Atonement According to Aquinas” in Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology, ed. 
michael rea, (oxford, oxford university Press, 2009), vol. 1, pp. 267-293.
17 For this type of criticism among writers who attack Christianity, see for example 
Nietzsche, The Antichrist, § 41: “‘how could God allow it!’ [Jesus’ death] to which the 
deranged reason of the little community [Jesus’ disciples] formulated an answer that 
was terrifying in its absurdity: God gave his son as a sacrifice for the forgiveness of sins. 
At once there was an end of the gospels! Sacrifice for sin, and in its most obnoxious 
ClArIFYING tHe CoNCePt oF SAlVAtIoN 395
the passion and death of Christ, this theory doesn’t really assign to other 
aspects of his existence – his incarnation and even more importantly, his 
resurrection considered in themselves – any significant role in the work 
of salvation.
Therefore, without rejecting the fundamental importance of 
satisfaction and atonement in the concept of salvation, it is tempting 
to look for another explanation, or, more modestly, a  complementary 
explanation of the modus operandi of Christian salvation understood as 
Christ’s freeing us from sin.
IV. AN AttemPt to eXPlAIN tHe StAtemeNt “FAItH 
IN tHe reSurreCtIoN oF CHrISt SAVeS meN From SIN”
It’s just this type of explanation I’d like to offer. I have tried to take into 
account an important trend in contemporary theology, which is really 
a  corollary of the current turn away from satisfaction theories: the 
rejection of an exclusively sacrificial or expiatory theory of salvation, 
and the desire to see that the thinking that focuses exclusively on 
Jesus’s passion and marginalizes the resurrection stop dominating the 
discussion. This agenda, which has been, in a way, the height of fashion 
in european salvation theology since the 1950’s18, has been clear in its 
critical project, clear about what it is rejecting. It has also been clear in 
its general theoretical aim: “to restore Christ’s victory, and return Christ’s 
resurrection to the central place in treatises on redemption it should 
never have lost”; “[to show that] the resurrection plays a  fundamental 
and barbarous form: sacrifice of the innocent for the sins of the guilty! What appalling 
paganism!”. And in a Christian author, see for example, rené Girard, Des choses cachées 
depuis la fondation du monde (Paris, Grasset, 1978), p. 269: “God [would] not just be 
demanding a new victim, he [would] be demanding the most precious, most cherished 
victim: his own son. This claim has done more than anything else, no doubt, to discredit 
Christianity in the eyes of men of good will in the modern world. It might have been 
tolerable to the medieval mind, but it has become intolerable to ours, and has become the 
stumbling block par excellence for an entire world repelled by the concept of sacrifice.”
18 examples of this tendency born in the inter-war period among Protestant 
theologians (like Karl barth) include: François-Xavier Durrwell, Walter Kasper, Joseph 
moingt, Jürgen moltmann (at least in Theology of Hope), Wolhart Pannenberg, Karl 
rahner, bernard Sesboüe, michel Deneken.
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role in salvation.”19 but when it comes to the constructive side of the 
agenda, to specific explanations in support of the general aim, the results 
have been more problematic, less successful. I am here attempting one 
such specific explanation of the statement “faith in the resurrection of 
Christ saves us from sin.”
Here, now, is a summary of the argument I have developed to provide 
a philosophical clarification of this proposition. I will present it in four 
parts, each one corresponding to a section in my book.
(1) The first section offers a defence of a pragmatic approach to belief: 
beliefs should be considered not only with respect to their truth value, 
but also with respect to their effects, how they transform the believer 
and the world in which he acts. I say “not only…but also” because I don’t 
think we should lose interest in the truth of beliefs, or reject Clifford’s 
principle with its stipulation that the fundamental maxim of the ethics 
of belief is “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe 
anything upon insufficient evidence.” but nothing stands in the way of our 
connecting our interest in the truth of beliefs to a pragmatic investigation 
of beliefs. We will then supplement our interest in a belief ’s orthodoxy 
(how is its content theoretically righteous, speculatively correct) with 
a further question about its eudoxia (how is it beneficial for the believer 
who accepts it?). I offer a set of criteria for classifying beliefs from this 
pragmatic perspective, among which the two most fundamental are the 
magnitude and the value of a  belief ’s effects. We can thus distinguish 
between weak beliefs, which have a  minimal impact on the believer’s 
life (“beliefs with weak existential implications”), and highly effective 
ones, which have a significant impact on the life of those who come to 
believe them (“beliefs with strong existential implications”). We can also 
distinguish beliefs that produce correct or beneficial behaviour in those 
who accept them (eupraxic beliefs) from beliefs that produce incorrect or 
harmful behaviour (dyspraxic beliefs).
(2) Section II focuses on the notion of death. It takes as its starting 
point the classical view that any proposition about the nature of death 
(and more particularly of my death) can be an object of belief only, 
19 In this order: Henri de lubac, Le Mystère du surnaturel, ([1965], Paris, Cerf, 2000), 
p. 20; bernard Sesboüe, Jésus-Christ dans la tradition de l’Église ([1982], Paris, Desclée de 
brouwer, 2000), p. 238.
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that positive knowledge or science about my death is impossible. If we 
accept this, then we are led to ask, even in this life: which among the 
available beliefs about death are beneficial and which are harmful? In 
the remainder of section II, I  explain, without much original thought, 
that we spontaneously and naturally believe that death is the end of 
life, and that in most cases we are afraid of death so understood. As the 
expression ‘fear of death’ is a  little bland and not always clear, I  try to 
narrow it down by distinguishing different types or different degrees of 
fear of death. It ranges from the instinctual reaction we share with other 
animals, fleeing death as a fundamental threat, an annihilation of what 
we are insofar as we are alive, to highly intellectualized responses like 
the great artistic evocations of death (mozart’s Requiem, molière’s Don 
Juan) or philosophical investigations like Heidegger’s study of anxiety. 
The general idea underlying this section is that we are naturally fearful of 
a death we interpret as the end of life.
(3) Section III shows that this standard belief about death is 
fundamentally dyspraxic, that is, it leads the believer to behave in 
ways that are bad and harmful, and which depending on one’s lexical 
preferences, one can call faults, “bad deeds” or “sins”. I will call this thesis, 
that there is a causal connection between the fear of death and sin, “the 
lucretius hypothesis” because the idea is expressed, albeit without any 
detail about the precise nature of the connection, at the beginning of 
book III of De rerum natura:
... and the old fear of Acheron driven headlong away, which utterly 
confounds the life of men from the very root, clouding all things with the 
blackness of death, and suffering no pleasure to be pure and unalloyed 
(…) Avarice and the blind craving for honours, which constrain wretched 
men to overleap the boundaries of right, and sometimes as comrades or 
accomplices in crime to struggle night and day with surpassing toil to 
rise up to the height of power-these sores in life are fostered in no small 
degree by the fear of death. For most often scorned disgrace and biting 
poverty are seen to be far removed from pleasant settled life, and are, 
as it were, a present dallying before the gates of death; and while men, 
spurred by a false fear, desire to flee far from them, and to drive them 
far away, they amass substance by civil bloodshed and greedily multiply 
their riches, heaping slaughter on slaughter. Hardening their heart they 
revel in a brother’s bitter death, and hate and fear their kinsmen’s board. 
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In like manner, often through the same fear, they waste with envy that 
he is powerful, he is regarded, who walks clothed with bright renown; 
while they complain that they themselves are wrapped in darkness and 
the mire. Some of them come to ruin to win statues and a  name; and 
often through fear of death so deeply does the hatred of life and the sight 
of the light possess men, that with sorrowing heart they compass their 
own death, forgetting that it is this fear which is the source of their woes, 
which assails their honour, which bursts the bonds of friendship, and 
overturns affection from its lofty throne. For often ere now men have 
betrayed country and beloved parents, seeking to shun the realms of 
Acheron. For even as children tremble and fear everything in blinding 
darkness, so we sometimes dread in the light things that are no whit more 
to be feared than what children shudder at in the dark, and imagine will 
come to pass.20
In a number of analyses that I can’t repeat here in any detail, I go on to 
show that the fear of death understood as the end of life leads to a series 
of evil actions: avarice or greed, gluttony, lust, homicide, disrespect to 
father and mother, and pride.
by way of example, here is how we can establish a connection between 
fear of death and avarice, using a text from Karl marx as support:
That which is for me through the medium of money –  that for which 
I can pay (i.e., which money can buy) – that am I myself, the possessor of 
the money. The extent of the power of money is the extent of my power. 
money’s properties are my –  the possessor’s –  properties and essential 
powers. Thus, what I am and am capable of is by no means determined by 
my individuality. I am ugly, but I can buy for myself the most beautiful of 
women. Therefore I am not ugly, for the effect of ugliness – its deterrent 
power – is nullified by money […] I am bad, dishonest, unscrupulous, 
stupid; but money is honoured, and hence its possessor. money is the 
supreme good, therefore its possessor is good. money, besides, saves me 
the trouble of being dishonest: I  am therefore presumed honest. I  am 
brainless, but money is the real brain of all things and how then should 
its possessor be brainless? besides, he can buy clever people for himself, 
and is he who has power over the clever not more clever than the clever? 
Do not I, who thanks to money am capable of all that the human heart 
20 lucretius, De natura rerum, III, v. 37-90, trans. Cyril bayley
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longs for, possess all human capacities?[...]That which I am unable to do 
as a man, and of which therefore all my individual essential powers are 
incapable, I am able to do by means of money.21
The text reminds us of the specific function traditionally attributed to 
money: it is the universal mediator, the converter that makes all things 
commensurate by translating disparate realities and use-values into the 
same yard stick (the exchange value). to this classical analysis, marx adds 
the idea that the act of buying, understood as an act of appropriation, 
causes the attributes of the property to be transferred to its owner. by 
merging the two driving ideas of this marxist analysis, we can answer the 
question: in this mode of production and exchange, what is the object 
whose appropriation money fundamentally allows, and whose properties 
an owner claims for himself, at least at the level of fantasy?
It is time.
Wage-labour, after all, is the employer’s use of his capital to “buy 
himself ” his employees’ time as well as the product of their work during 
that time. A commodity, likewise, is just the fruit of the work-time needed 
to produce it. It follows that buying and hoarding money (avarice in the 
strict sense), or objects (in particular, manufactured objects), in other 
words, being miserly in the broad sense, is really amassing human time, 
in so far as it is instantiated, and has been, in a certain sense, deposited 
in those objects. The more money we have, therefore, the more able we 
are to appropriate other people’s time, buying it with wages, or buying it 
through the mediation of the commodities it has produced, and the more 
justified we feel in thinking of all this time as potentially our own.
Whether he consumes or saves, and whether his saving is an end in 
itself or the means to future consumption, the miser doesn’t believe that 
“time is money”; he is rather moved by the belief that “money is time”, 
that in the world in which he acts, having money means being able to 
acquire other people’s time, literally, “saving time” or “buying time”.
We can thus interpret the amassing of money as a more or less conscious 
fantasy promise of an indefinite heap of time, the illusory assurance that 
our existence will continue indefinitely, and so, as a fantasized attempt to 
escape our fear of death.
21 Karl marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Third Manuscript, tans. 
martin milligan.
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This, then, is how a  causal and explanatory connection can be 
established between the fear of death on the one hand, and avarice or 
greed on the other. using a number of different theoretical tools, I  try 
to show in section III of my book that the same connection can be 
established between fear of death understood as the end of life on the one 
hand, and gluttony, lust, homicide, disrespect to mother and father, and 
pride on the other.
Section III’s general conclusion, then, is that the common belief 
about death has the characteristic effect of leading human beings to this 
type of evil act. The fear of death tends to land us in a kind of existential 
mediocrity, or, in the worst cases an existential incompetence. In other 
words, the standard belief about death is fundamentally and globally 
dyspraxic: it causes us to settle in a negative state that we can also call 
a state of sin, from which we need to be “saved”, right now, in this life.
(4) In the fourth section, I finally turn to the question of salvation. to 
be saved from the negative state described in the previous section, one 
might adopt an orthopraxic belief about death – a belief that frees us from 
the evil acts we commit out of fear of death, and sets in motion a series 
of intellectual and emotional reactions that improve human existence. 
Here my remarks turn avowedly Christian: for I believe that the Christian 
belief that death has been defeated by Christ is such a belief, orthopraxic 
in the highest degree.
I  do not discuss the question of the truth or epistemic reliability 
of this belief in my book: I  have nothing new to say on this subject.22 
I accept this belief in a hypothetical way, following a method sometimes 
called philosophical theology. I ask: “If someone believes that Christ is 
resurrected, thereby signalling to us that death is not in fact the end of 
life, then what happens?”
All the elements I have discussed so far are falling into place to form 
a philosophical explication of how Christian salvation works. The belief 
in Christ’s resurrection abolishes the ordinary representation of death 
as an absolute end, as well as the fearful relationship that follows.23 This 
22 on this theme, see, for example, richard  Swinburne, The Resurrection of God 
Incarnate (oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003).
23 Cf. Athanasius of Alexandria, The Incarnation of the Word, 27 (Paris, Cerf, 1973, 
“Sources chrétiennes” no. 199), pp. 362-365: “Death has been destroyed, and the cross 
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belief, then, is able to free us from the morally bad consequences (the 
sins) of the ordinary representation of death and our reaction to it. Thus, 
going back to the definition already spelled out, salvation is:
A process whose beneficiaries are moved from a negative situation… 
That is, humanity’s situation as depicted in section III: “led astray” by 
the ordinary representation of death, and with a propensity to morally 
undesirable acts.
… to a new fulfilled existence…A man who no longer acts as described 
in section III has settled into a  better realm of existence, one that is 
qualitatively superior to his former existence, not only because he is 
now rid of certain negative features, but also because he finds himself 
in a new set of circumstances conducive to leading a new life, one where 
dynamisms and capacities that could not be developed in his former 
existence can flourish. Ancient authors summarized it this way: “Christ 
killed the death that was killing man”; “he cast death’s tyranny out of our 
nature completely by rising from the dead.”24
… by the action of an external agent. Salvation is brought about by 
the power of the belief in Christ’s resurrection. From an objective or 
historical standpoint, the external agent, the saviour, can be identified as 
Jesus Christ. If, on the other hand, we focus on the information contained 
in the proposition “Christ is resurrected,” then the external agency is 
a revealed body of faith. For this proposition cannot be deduced from 
natural principles of human knowledge, nor can it be demonstrated 
a  priori, and it is no doubt quite different from an ordinary piece of 
historical or experiential knowledge. It must therefore be a “revelation”, 
which means that it presents for belief a body of knowledge that does 
represents the victory won over it. It has no strength left, it is really dead. […] ever since 
the Saviour resurrected his own body, death is no longer frightening. All those who 
believe in Christ […] really know that if they die, they do not perish but live.”
24 melito of Sardis, Peri Pascha (Paris, Cerf, 1966 “Sources chrétiennes”, no.  123), 
pp. 96-97; Nicholas Cabasilas, The Life in Christ, III, 7 (Paris, Cerf, 1989-1990 “Sources 
chrétiennes” no.  355 and 361), p. 243. The text of this 14th century byzantine author 
deserves to be quoted more completely: “Thus, while men were cut off from God in three 
ways –  through nature, through sin and through death –  the saviour allowed them to 
meet him perfectly […], by removing one by one all the obstacles that kept them apart: 
[he removed the obstacle of] nature by sharing in humanity, the obstacle of sin by dying 
on the cross, and the last obstacle, the tyranny of death, he completely expelled from our 
nature by rising from the dead.”
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not and cannot come from “me”, but is given from elsewhere. of course 
it belongs to the world, it appears in it, but from a source that is divine, 
or claimed to be so. 
to use a different language: all the analyses I’ve developed so far now 
make it possible to explain the proposition “faith in the resurrection 
of Christ frees men from sin”. If these earlier hypotheses are granted, 
then faith in the resurrection of Christ will, or should, set in motion 
in the individual who accepts it a  series of intellectual and emotional 
transformations that improve his existence. If, as I  have argued, the 
central problem of human life, what leads us astray and ruins our lives, 
is precisely a certain fearful relationship to death understood as the end 
of life, then the belief that death has been vanquished – a belief central 
and unique to Christianity25 – must be an excellent way to reach salvation 
–  where salvation is understood as an improvement of existence that 
begins in this life, not in its eschatological sense (though, of course I don’t 
reject that sense of the word).
CoNCluSIoN
In conclusion, let me make four qualifications to the thesis I am defending.
(a) I am not, of course, claiming that we are saved through knowledge, 
and that salvation is available only to the “experts” who think seriously 
about how salvation works. That would be Gnosticism, and I  am not 
a Gnostic. It is faith that saves in my view, and it is “enough”, so to speak, 
to believe that Christ is resurrected to enter into the process of salvation 
I describe. Someone who thinks seriously about the problem just adds 
an explanation of how the dynamics works, or tries to make the process 
intelligible.
(b) The thesis I  am defending does assert that salvation or 
“justification” is brought about by faith, or, more precisely, by faith in 
Christ’s resurrection with its message that death has been defeated.26 I am 
here using the world faith in a strong sense, the sense of the credere in 
25 See the famous claim by Paul of tarsus in I Corinthians, 15:14: “if Christ had not 
been raised, then our proclamation has been in vain and your faith has been in vain.” 
(New revised Standard Version)
26 Cf. Saint Augustin, Contra Faustum, 16, 29, migne Pl, vol. 42, col. 336 : “The very 
resurrection in which we believe justifies us.”
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Deum, of strong conviction, a  deep and sincere adherence that causes 
noticeable changes in the believer’s interactions with the world. It is 
faith used in this sense that has certain consequences for the believer’s 
salvation in my remarks above. It is again, faith used in this strong sense 
that contemporary authors call performative: “the Christian message 
was not only ‘informative’ but ‘performative’”; “is the Christian faith 
[…] ‘performative’ for us –  is it a  message which shapes our life in 
a new way, or is it just ‘information’ which, in the meantime, we have 
set aside and which now seems to us to have been superseded by more 
recent information?”27 If, by ‘performative” (in the broad sense)28 we 
understand the property whereby certain beliefs not only represent 
a state of affairs (“information”), but also produce a change by forming 
or transforming other beliefs and behaviours, then we can indeed speak 
of the saving character of performative faith in Christ’s resurrection: 
the belief that death has been defeated has the characteristic effect of 
producing salvation. being freed from sin – that is, being less tempted, 
better able to resist temptation, committing fewer or even none of 
the morally reprehensible acts described above – flows directly from the 
radical modification in the meaning of death that comes from accepting 
the belief in Christ’s resurrection.
c) on the other hand, in this defence of salvation through faith, I do 
not mean to commit myself to a specific position in the age-old (though 
nowadays mostly becalmed) theological debate about the respective roles 
of faith and works (i.e., individual actions) in salvation. even if my thesis 
can nominally evoke the sola fide of the reformation, since it gives faith 
the essential role in the production of salvation, it is in fact closer to the 
position generally thought of as the Catholic one: where the emphasis is 
on how man is brought into a situation where he can act well, and, using 
his freedom correctly, (subjectively) appropriate the salvation Christ 
brings (objectively). In this light, justification becomes the fact of finding 
oneself in a new practical context, one where obstacles and obstructions 
to right action no longer bind us when we act, so that it becomes possible 
for us to be just. on this interpretation, then, justification is more 
27 Joseph ratzinger/benedict XVI, encyclical Spe Salvi, §2 and §10.
28 In the narrow sense (that of J.l. Austin) used in the philosophy of language, only 
public utterances (and not mental states) that actualize what they describe, or “do what 
they say”, are called ‘performative’. 
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a journey than a consequence of faith in the resurrection that is acquired 
once and for all; it is not so much a state in which we find ourselves, as 
the lifelong tension required for becoming just. Collectively, it is less an 
event we can describe as having happened, than the process in which, 
according to Christianity, human beings have been involved since the 
discovery of the empty tomb. The idea that what leads to salvation is 
revealed implies a certain receptivity, or even passivity, as the intervention 
of a God or saviour implies heteronomy. but, it turns out, none of these 
are incompatible with the individual’s having, or needing to have some 
personal agency in the process of his salvation, that is, with the possibility 
that the individual’s actions will have the character of an auto-salvation. 
receptivity and passivity are the starting point, necessary conditions for 
a new mode of action that an individual can’t adopt on his own.
d) Finally, I want to say more about what it means for this discussion 
of Christ’s saving action to shift the focus from the passion to the 
resurrection – something scholastic theology often saw as nothing more 
than a happy ending (it’s always better when the good guy wins) or else 
a “miracle” meant to elicit or strengthen faith.29 First of all, the shift of 
focus does not imply that the darkness of Good Friday was useless or 
superfluous, that Jesus’s dying on the cross after a degrading agony was 
irrelevant, or that nothing essential would be missing if he had died 
peacefully in his bed before being resurrected a few days later, or even 
more to the point, if he had proclaimed his victory over death without 
dying himself. First, as theologians in the first few centuries explained 
in their arguments against the docetist heresy, the reality of Christ’s 
resurrection and humanity require the reality of his death. Second, the 
passion insofar as it is sorrowful and negative, and the resurrection, are 
like two facets of the same event – an event that brings salvation30 and 
29 See, for example, Cajetan’s commentary on Saint Paul (on romans 4:25) Epistolae 
Pauli et aliorum apostolorum [...] juxta sensum literalem enarratae [1531]. 
30 ultimately, Thomas Aquinas doesn’t disagree: “as to efficiency, which comes of the 
Divine power, the Passion as well as the Resurrection of Christ is the cause of justification.” 
Summa Theologiae III, question 56, article 2 ad 4. This same question in the Summa 
parcels out each one’s role by distinguishing two aspects in the “complete” concept of 
redemption: the passion and death of Christ cause the forgiveness of sins by providing 
satisfaction, while the resurrection institutes a new life. In every case, finding “the correct 
dose” of passion and resurrection respectively seems to be one of the central concerns of 
Christian soteriology.
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revelation – which can only be fully understood by focusing alternatively 
on one or the other of its facets. In its initial phase, this event reveals 
that salvation is not obtained easily; it is not obtained through the 
means usually promoted in the world (power, riches, honour, will to 
dominate), through violence, the desire to punish or to seek vengeance. 
Christ’s passion shows that the road to salvation is hard, and that the 
fight against evil and everything that leads to it is sometimes painful and 
can require great sacrifice. The passion reminds us that “there is here 
an ordered sequence that Christ himself followed: first the passion, then 
the glorification. […] As long as our life here on earth lasts, suffering 
and death come before joy and resurrection.”31 As the theologians say, it 
was “appropriate,” from this point of view, that Christ should die in the 
agony of the cross. However, the passion (and this includes its role in 
salvation) can be fully understood only in the light of the later event that 
gives it meaning. A story in which Jesus was only crucified would have 
a  completely different meaning. or it might not have any meaning at 
all, like a symbol of the absurdity and cruelty of the world. So, following 
Karl barth, I  want to warn those who think seriously about Christian 
justification and salvation against the Nordic melancholy of a  (good) 
Friday theology, abstractly focused on the cross alone and forgetful of 
resurrection Sunday.
The seriousness with which we insist on the starting point of justification 
is a good and necessary thing, that is, on the fact […] that we can only go 
in one direction: from the death [of Jesus] on the cross to his resurrection. 
And so we must consider first what is past, that is, our death which he 
suffered, then what is future, that is, the life he received. […] but we must 
see to it that this seriousness – there are examples of this both in roman 
Catholic and also in Protestant circles –  does not, at a  certain point 
which is hard to define, become a pagan instead of a purely Christian 
seriousness, changing suddenly into a  “Nordic morbidity”, losing the 
direction in which alone it can have any Christian meaning, suddenly 
beginning to look backwards instead of forwards, transforming itself into 
the tragedy of an abstract Theologia crucis which can have little and finally 
nothing whatever to do with the Christian knowledge of Jesus Christ. 
31 Hans urs von balthasar, Theodramatik, 5 vol., Fribourg-einsiedeln, Johannes Verlag, 
1973-1983, vol. 4
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[…] The knowledge of our justification as it has taken place in Him can 
not possibly be genuinely serious except in this joy, the easter joy.32
Finally, I  do not for a  moment claim that this explanation of how 
salvation works is the only valid one or that it excludes all others. It is, for 
instance, perfectly compatible with the satisfaction or atonement theory. 
ultimately, I think that the best description of the Christian conception 
of salvation is this: “Christ’s incarnation, his life and acts, his passion, 
death and resurrection, are what make salvation from sin possible.” of 
course, one could say that all this constitutes just one event of salvation, 
the “Jesus Christ event”. but as soon as we try to explain how this salvation 
really works, we end up distinguishing different explanatory frameworks; 
some that focus more on the incarnation’s saving power as is the case with 
so-called deification-theories, others like satisfaction theories, that focus 
more on the passion. As a  philosopher, and following in the footsteps 
of some of Saint Paul’s texts33, I  have wanted to draw attention to the 
soteriological value of faith in the resurrection.34
32 K. barth, Die Kirchliche Dogmatik (Zurich, evangelischer Verlag Zollikon, 
1932-1967) IV, vol. 1, ch. 14, §61, 2
33 For example, romans 10:9: “if you confess with your lips that Jesus is lord and 
believe in your heart that God raised him from the dead, you will be saved.” (New revised 
Standard Version) on this point, see Stanislas lyonnet: “la Valeur sotériologique de 
la résurrection selon saint Paul” in Christus victor mortis, Gregorianum 39-2 (1958), 
pp. 295-318.
34 because I want to stick to a philosophical approach, I do not tackle the theme, in all 
respects difficult, of original sin. The thesis that I defend retains this claim characteristic 
of Christian theology:  between death and sin, there is a  causal relationship  in the 
strong sense of productive causality. but it reverses the direction  in which  the 
theological tradition,  following  a  possible  interpretation of the texts  of St.  Paul 
(eg. romans, 5, 12) has most often considered this relationship: sin (of Adam ) would 
have produced  death  (the  mortality  of man,  the “finiteness”)  that is to say,  strictly 
speaking,  the fact  of dying  and, in  an analogical sense, the  “spiritual death” brought 
about by the breakdown in the relationship with God. If we take “death” in the strict and 
biological  sense, achievements  of modern science  seem  difficult to reconcile with  this 
view (as, in all cases, the theme of a unique and temporally determined peccatum originale 
originans). my interpretation avoids this problem, considering that sin, as a situation, and 
from there the sins, as actions, follow from mortality as it is spontaneously understood as 
a  fundamental characteristic, both  biological and  existential,  of humanity.  The 
point is not to  identify  “sin” and “finiteness”, but  to show  how sin  stems from a  form 
of spiritual negativity inherent to a certain understanding of finiteness, probably de facto 
inevitable, but not insurmountable.
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I  don’t think that anyone can be certain with categorical certainty, 
that the proposition “Christ is risen from the dead” is true. Accepting 
it will always imply an irreducible element of faith, something like a bet 
that answers the existential question “what may I  hope?” as much as 
the historical one “what can I know?”. but if this proposition is true, if 
death really has been conquered by a fully human person, this implies 
an unprecedented existential transformation, whose full array of 
consequences, in my view, contemporary philosophers, including those 
who have paid a  lot of attention to the relation between life and death 
(phenomenology, for instance, in Heidegger) have not analyzed. I have 
tried here to sketch out a few of those consequences, while at the same 
time suggesting that there is a  real existential benefit to the belief that 
Christ is risen from the dead, in betting, as Pascal understood the word, 
that he is really risen.
